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COMMENT 
SHOPPING IN THE MARKETPLACE 
OF IDEAS: 
WHY FASHIONVALLEYMALL 
MEANS TARGET AND TRADER 
JOE'S ARE THE NEW TOWN 
SQUARES 
INTRODUCTION 
A "soapbox" is defined as "an improvised platform used by a self-
appointed, spontaneous, or informal orator.,,1 Soapboxes have long been 
recognized as symbols of the opportunity for any individual in an open 
society to introduce new ideas to others.2 Pioneering political activist 
Harvey Milk famously announced his campaign for San Francisco 
Supervisor while standing on an old crate labeled "SOAP" on the corner 
of Castro and Market Streets.3 But what if Harvey Milk had been told he 
could not set up his soapbox and speak out on the corner where people 
gathered, but instead was relegated to giving his speech in an out-of-the-
way alley where few people, if any, would be there to hear his words? If 
I WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2160 
(\976). 
2 The tenn "soapbox" was popularized in 1872 at "Speakers' Comer" in the Hyde Park 
neighborhood of London. See CahaI Mirno, At the Home of the Soap-Box, There is a Lot of Froth 
but Little Substance, THE INDEPENDENT UK, Nov. 5 ,2001; Leslie Jones, Hyde Park and Free 
Speech, HYDE PARK SOCIALIST (No. 34, Winter 1976-77). 
3 MILK (Focus Features 2008); see also Steven T. Jones, Politics Behind the Picture, SAN 
FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN, Nov. 19,2008. 
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the grassroots movement Milk sparked4 had instead sputtered, the loss 
would not have been merely Milk's, because every constriction of the 
free flow of ideas in American democracy harms us all. 
The right to engage in free expression is merely a hollow promise if 
people who choose to exercise that right are not afforded the opportunity 
to speak where their words may be heard. The First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides a foundation for the protection of 
free expression in American society.5 Furthermore, some states offer 
free-speech protection that is more expansive than that provided by the 
U.S. Constitution.6 Since the seminal California Supreme Court decision 
of Robins v. Pruneyard,7 California has stood at the forefront of those 
states that provide state constitutional protection for free speech broader 
than the First Arnendment.8 
In Pruneyard, the court held that the liberty clause of the California 
State Constitution mandates that there must be sufficient places available 
so that citizens who choose to exercise their free-speech rights may do so 
in a meaningful way.9 The court held that the California ConstitutionlO 
protects the right of free expression not only in the traditional public 
forums of parks, sidewalks and downtown business districts, which are 
the primary protected places for free speech under the First 
Amendment, II but also in shopping malls and on other private property 
4 When Harvey Milk won a seat on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in November 
1977, he became an instant icon as the most visible openly gay elected official in the nation. He 
authored a civil rights ordinance outlawing discrimination based on sexual orientation, the strongest 
such law in the nation, and opened up City Hall to citizen participation by emphasizing grassroots 
politics and the power of neighborhoods. Time Magazine named Milk one of the" I 00 Heroes and 
Icons of the 20th Century" as a "symbol of what gays can accomplish and the dangers they face in 
doing so." Milk was killed by an assassin's bullet less than one year after taking office but his 
legacy has endured and continues to inspire. See John Cloud, Harvey Milk, TIME, June 14, 1999; see 
generally RANDy SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK 
(1982). 
S U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
6 See Harriet D. Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private Shopping 
Center's Prohibitions or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or Activity, 52 
A.L.R.5th 195 (1997). 
7 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
8 See Harriet D. Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private Shopping 
Center's Prohibitions or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or Activity, 52 
A.L.R.5th 195 (1997). 
9 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899. 
10 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (a) ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or 
abridge liberty of speech or press."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 (a) ("The people have the right to 
instruct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to 
consult for the common good."). 
II Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) ("The privilege ofa citizen of 
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that has largely replaced the gathering places of old. This became known 
as the "Pruneyard Doctrine.,,12 
However, in the three decades since Pruneyard, questions have 
been raised about the scope, and even the viability, of the Pruneyard 
Doctrine in the modern era.13 The California Supreme Court added to 
the perception that Pruneyard was being narrowed when it held that the 
liberty clause does not protect the right of tenants to engage in free-
speech activity in private apartment buildings.14 Moreover, California 
appellate court decisions have utilized an increasingly restrictive 
interpretation of the Pruneyard court's analysis of what kind of private 
property is a public forum that is constitutionally required to allow free-
speech activities. '5 
In late 2007, the California Supreme Court directly answered some 
of the questions raised in the decades since Pruneyard was first decided. 
This Note asserts that in Fashion Valley Mall v. NLRB the court put to 
rest the concerns about Pruneyard's continued viability. This Note 
explains that in Fashion Valley Mall, for the first time since the 
California high court decided Pruneyard nearly thirty years earlier, the 
court directly affirmed the notion that the California Constitution's 
liberty clause protects the right to free-speech activities on private 
property, such as a large shopping mall, that has taken on the 
characteristics of a traditional downtown business district. 16 This Note 
further asserts that the majority's opinion in Fashion Valley Mall 
requires a different approach from that taken by the state appellate courts 
in deciding whether "stand-alone stores" such as Target and Trader Joe's 
also qualify as public forums where free-speech activity is 
constitutionally protected. 
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views ... must not, in the guise 
of regulation, be abridged or denied."). 
12 Pruneyard, 23 Ca1.3d at 910 ("We conclude that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the 
California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers 
even when the centers are privately owned."). 
13 See generally Curtis 1. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633 (1991); Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145 
(2007). 
14 See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001). 
15 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425 (1999) 
(initiative petition signature gathering could be prohibited by Trader Joe's on its property because 
the signature gatherers failed to provide evidence that the Trader Joe's store had supplanted the 
town's central business district as the preferred place people chose to come to meet and spend time 
with one another); see also Van v. Target Corp., ISS Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007) (signature gatherers 
failed to prove the entrance area of a retail store functioned as a public forum); Albertson's, Inc. v. 
Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003) (signature gatherers failed to prove a grocery store was the 
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum). 
16 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850 (2007). 
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Part I will provide a brief background of the public forum doctrine, 
the California Constitution's liberty clause and the key California cases 
in this area oflaw. Part II will analyze the status of Pruneyard in light of 
Fashion Valley Mall and explore how lower courts currently determine 
whether private property qualifies as a constitutionally protected free-
speech area. Finally, Part III will explain that the current analysis being 
used by appellate courts overly restricts the number of places that are 
available for free-speech activities. Following Fashion Valley Mall, 
courts should now presume that free-speech activities on private property 
that the owner has voluntarily opened to the public are constitutionally 
protected. Courts should place the burden of proving that free-speech 
activities would interfere with the use of their property on those property 
owners who wish to prohibit free-speech activities. 
I. THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION PROTECTS PLACES FOR 
FREE SPEECH: FROM THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE TO 
FASHION VALLEY MALL 
To enhance the discussion of Fashion Valley Mall, a review of basic 
free-speech law and the U.S. Supreme Court's public forum doctrine will 
be provided. Next, the California Constitution's liberty clause and the 
seminal decision of the California Supreme Court applying free-speech 
protection to private property, Pruneyard, will be discussed. This 
section will also present state court decisions since Prune yard that have 
adopted an increasingly narrow definition of "public forum." Finally, 
this section will set forth the facts and procedural history of Fashion 
Valley Mall. 
A. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
The freedom of speech is widely considered the most fundamental 
freedom because it is protective of all others. 17 If the government or 
other powerful forces should seek to constrain a citizen from practicing 
her preferred religion, raising her family as she sees fit, or exercising her 
right to be left alone, it is the freedom of speech that allows the citizen to 
call attention to her plight and rally others to her defense. 18 Without the 
17 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964); see also Stromberg v. Cal., 283 
U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by 
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of 
our constitutional system."). 
18 See Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357,375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) ("Those who 
won our independence believed that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a 
4
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right to speak freely and be heard by others, each citizen would be left 
alone to fend for herself against the powers that be. 19 As U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo characterized it, free speech is "the 
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.,,20 
To express a message in a manner that actually reaches others 
requires more than just permission to speak - it requires places for that 
speech to actually occur. However, most people do not have the 
resources to buy billboards, pay for mass mailings, or place their own ads 
in the newspaper, on television or on Google.21 While mass-media 
communication is by far the most effective way of reaching large 
numbers of people, one-on-one dialogue provides an avenue for "cheap 
speech" that everyone can afford.22 Moreover, particularly in the context 
of smaller neighborhood quality-of-life issues and local elections, in-
person conversations provide the opportunity for meaningful dialogue 
and two-way interaction. This can produce a "participatory politics" that 
advances ideas and understanding far beyond what one-way 
advertisements can achieve.23 However, to ensure that meaningful in-
person dialogue is a real possibility and not merely nostalgia for a 
bygone era, citizens must have access to physical locations that provide 
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human 
institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that 
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the 
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; 
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as 
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its 
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed."), overroled on other grounds, 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
19 Id.; see also Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. I, 14 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues and 
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution."). 
20 Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Md., 395 
U.S. 784, 794 (1969). 
21 For example, even during an economic downturn, the average cost of airing a single 30-
second television commercial in prime time during the 2007-2008 season was estimated at $130,089. 
Brian Steinberg, Price of a 30-Second TV Spot Slumps 4. I%, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 6, 2008. 
22 Owen M. Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781, 792 (1987) (discussing the need for 
the state to playa role in providing access to the general public to mass media outlets and other 
outlets for effective political expression but also asserting that what one of his colleagues called 
"cheap speech" is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, component of protected expression). 
23 BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE, 
151, 154-55 (1984) ("Strong democracy is defined by politics in the participatory mode: literally, it 
is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens .... 
Participatory politics deals with public disputes and conflicts of interest by subjecting them to a 
never-ending process of deliberation, decision, and action .... At the moment when 'masses' start 
deliberating, acting, sharing, and contributing, they cease to be masses and become citizens."). 
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them with the opportunity to share ideas with others.24 
The U.S. Supreme Court initially refused to recognize any 
constitutional right to use property - public or private - for free-speech 
purposes.25 But in a pair of decisions in 1939 the Court changed course 
and recognized the right to use at least some kinds of public property for 
free-speech activities: "Wherever the tide of streets and parks may rest, 
they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, 
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions. ,,26 The Court thus articulated what became known and widely 
accepted as the "public forum doctrine," characterizing government 
property such as sidewalks and parks as "public forums" that the 
government is constitutionally obligated to make available for free-
speech activities.27 Later, the Court also considered, but ultimately 
rejected, claims that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also 
requires that private property that has taken on the characteristics of a 
public forum must be made available for free-speech activities.28 
However, the Court also held that nothing in the U.S. Constitution bars 
states from adopting stronger protections for free speech in their state 
constitutions.29 
B. BROADER SPEECH PROTECTIONS IN THE CALIFORNIA 
CONSTITUTION 
On a quiet Saturday afternoon in 1978, a group of high-school 
students set up a card table in the corner of the courtyard at a mall in 
Campbell, California.3o The mall was the privately owned Pruneyard 
24 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1342 (2d ed. 2005) ("Speech often 
requires a place for it to occur. Most people lack access to the mass media - television, radio, 
newspapers - to express their message. They need to have a place to distribute leaflets or a comer to 
place a soapbox."). 
2S Davis v. Mass., 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (holding that a Massachusetts citizen did not have a 
constitutional right to make a public address in the public park known as the "Boston Common"). 
26 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Schneider v. N.J., 
308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
27 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1348 (2d ed. 2005). 
28 See Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), abrogated by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); 
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) ("[W]e make clear now, ifit was not clear before, that 
the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner."). 
29 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980), cited with approval in 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
Pub. Uti I. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 12 (1986) (plurality); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393 
(1994). 
30 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902 (1979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
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Shopping Center, a 21-acre facility open to the public with 65 shops, 10 
restaurants, a cinema and a central courtyard.31 The group of students 
had chosen to give up part of their weekend to work for a cause they 
believed in - they arrived at the Pruneyard Mall to collect signatures on a 
petition to the President of the United States supporting Israel and 
objecting to a United Nations resolution against Israeli "Zionism.,,32 
Soon after the students set up their card table, laid out their 
clipboards, and began asking passersby for a moment of their time, a 
private mall security guard approached the students and told them to 
leave.33 Although by all accounts the students had been peaceful and 
apparently well-received by mall patrons, the mall ordered them to leave 
because of a blanket policy prohibiting free-speech activity inside the 
mall.34 The students complied with the guard's request and left the 
mall.35 Then the students filed a lawsuit. 36 The result was the 1979 
California Supreme Court decision of Pruneyard.37 Four years earlier, 
the California Supreme Court had observed that the state's free-speech 
clause was "more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment.,,38 
But in Prune yard, the court for the first time explicitly held that this 
meant the California Constitution's liberty clause protects the right to 
free speech not only in public places but also on private property that has 
adopted the characteristics of a public forum. 39 
The Pruneyard court engaged in a balancing test, weighing the 
rights of the property owner to control his property against the societal 
interest in access to valuable places for free-speech activity.40 The court 
first reasoned that, since individual property rights must yield to the 
public interest in a variety of areas such as land use and environmental 




34 Id. ("Pruneyard's policy is not to pennit any tenant or visitor to engage in publicly 
expressive activity, including the circulating of petitions, that is not directly related to the 
commercial purposes."). 
3S Id. at 903. 
361d. at 902. 
37 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899, ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (explicitly recognizing states' 
authority to enact speech protections broader than those in the U.S. Constitution). 
38 Wilson v. Super. Ct., I3 Cal. 3d 652, 658 (I975) (noting that, unlike the U.S. Constitution, 
which characterizes the First Amendment right to free speech as a limit on Congressional power -
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," the California Constitution 
empowers every person with an affirmative right to free speech without qualification or reference to 
the state). 
39 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 908. 
40 Id. at 903-10. 
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protecting the constitutional right of freedom of speech.41 Then the court 
assessed the expansion of private shopping malls in modem life.42 The 
court noted that private shopping malls had increasingly displaced 
traditional downtown business districts as shopping venues.43 
Consequently, the court recognized that downtown business districts had 
become less valuable as outlets for the expression of ideas.44 In his 
dissent in an earlier case, Justice Stanley Mosk detailed the rapid growth 
of private shopping centers in recent years: "Increasingly, such centers 
are becoming 'miniature downtowns'; some contain major department 
stores, hotels, apartment houses, office buildings, theatres, and 
churches.,,45 Relying on the words of Justice Mosk, the Pruneyard 
majority concluded: 
His observations on the role of the [shopping] centers in our society 
are even more forceful now than when he wrote. The California 
Constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping 
centers to which the public is invited provide an essential and 
invaluable forum for exercising those rights.46 
C. THE "PRUNING OF PRUNEYARD,,47 
In the wake of Pruneyard, high courts in five other states -
Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington -
eventually followed California's lead in interpreting their state 
constitutions to protect at least some free-speech activities in privately 
41 Id. at 905-06 ('To hold otherwise would flout the whole development of law regarding 
states' power to regulate uses of property and would place a state's interest in strengthening First 
Amendment rights in an inferior rather than a superior position. '[All] private property is held 
subject to the power of the government to regulate its use for the public welfare.'" (citation 
omitted»; see also Agric. Lab. ReI. Bd. v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. 3d 392, 403 (1976) (noting that for 50 
years it had already been well established that the right to individual control over private property 
was subordinate to the general welfare when the two collided). 
42 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 907. 
43Id. 
44 Id. at 910; see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN ClTlES 4 
(Vintage Books 1992) (1961) (vividly describing the abandonment of downtowns for the suburbs 
due to a combination of planning, political and economic decisions, with the resulting disappearance 
of those traditional public gathering places that are so vital to the life of any healthy community). 
4sDiamond v. Bland, II Cal. 3d 331,342 (1974) (Mosk, J., dissenting), overruled by 
Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 910. 
46 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 910. 
41 See Alan E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting Free 
Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property oj Private Medical Clinics Providing 
Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073 (1991) ("The authors support the pruning of 
Prune yard. not the uprooting and overruling of its interpretation of the state constitution."). 
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owned shopping centers.48 However, two major developments occurred 
in the three decades since Pruneyard was decided that generated 
confusion about both its scope and validity. First, the California 
Supreme Court decision in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway 
Tenants Assn.,49 while not addressing Pruneyard's core holding, 
appeared to contradict Pruneyard's underlying rationale and fueled 
commentators' questioning of Pruneyard's wisdom and even its vitality 
as good law. 50 Second, a series of appellate court decisions over the last 
decade significantly narrowed the scope of Pruneyard. The appellate 
courts held that stand-alone stores such as Trader Joe's, Albertson's, and 
Target are not covered by the Prune yard doctrine, thus allowing those 
stores to entirely ban free-speech activities from their property.51 
1. Golden Gateway 
In the two decades following Pruneyard, the California Supreme 
Court did not directly address its central holding, leaving the precise 
scope of protection provided by California's liberty clause an open 
question. 52 Then in 2001, the high court in Golden Gateway held that the 
liberty clause in the California Constitution did not protect the right of a 
tenants' association to distribute its newsletter under the apartment doors 
48 Bock v. Westminster Mall, 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 
Inc., 455 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 
650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Lloyd Corp. v. WhitTen, 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993), abrogated by 
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., II P.3d 228, 243 (Or. 2000); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. 
Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981); see also Harriet D. Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State 
Constitutions, of Private Shopping Center's Prohibitions or Regulation of Political, Social, or 
Religious Expression or Activity, 52 A.L.R.5th 195 (1997) (also noting that courts in ten states -
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina and Wisconsin - have declined to find speech protected in shopping malls). 
49 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001). 
50 See Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1212 (2007) ("in 
sharp institutional and methodological contrast with Pruneyard, the [Golden Gateway] court 
carefully examined the text, history, and structure of the California Constitution, finding no basis for 
imposing constitutional obligations upon private citizens."); see also Harry G. Hutchison, Through 
the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collisions of Private Property Rights and Nonemployee 
Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. I (1994); Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in 
Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 133 
(1989). 
51 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007) (retail store could prohibit free-
speech activity at the entrance of its store); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003) 
(grocery store could ban signature gathering); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 
Cal. App. 4th 425 (1999) (store not violating free-speech rights by prohibiting initiative petition 
signature gathering because Trader Joe's was not a public forum). 
52 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1016 ("Since [Pruneyardj, courts and commentators have 
struggled to construe [Pruneyardj and determine the scope of protection provided by California's 
free speech clause."). 
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in its residential complex over the objections of the landlord.s3 The court 
detenmned that the exclusionary character of a private apartment 
complex made it significantly different from places that voluntarily open 
their doors to the public.s4 The court found that it was this intention to 
exclude, rather than invite, the general public that disqualified the 
apartment complex from being a public forum under Pruneyard.ss 
The Golden Gateway plurality also took the opportunity to criticize 
Pruneyard generally. The court noted that the Pruneyard court had been 
"less than clear" about the scope of the liberty clause's application to 
private property and exactly what kind of property was affected.s6 The 
court also pointed out that Pruneyard failed to address "the threshold 
issue of whether California's free-speech clause protects against only 
state action or also private conduct."s7 Finally, the Golden Gateway 
court noted that Pruneyard had simply provided "little guidance on how 
to apply it outside the large shopping center context."S8 
The Golden Gateway court completed its Prune yard critique by 
pointing out that "most of our sister courts interpreting state 
constitutional provisions similar in wording to California's free-speech 
provision have declined to follow [Pruneyard]."S9 The court listed 
numerous decisions that had been critical of Pruneyard.60 While the 
court stopped short of directly challenging Pruneyard's validity, it 
appeared to do so only because it was "obliged to follow it under the 
principles of stare decisis.,,61 Although the court did not say it was yet 
prepared to overrule Pruneyard,62 the consequence of Golden Gateway 
53Id. at 1022. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1033 ("Here, the Complex is privately owned, and Golden Gateway, the owner, 
restricts the public's access to the Complex. In fact, Golden Gateway carefully limits access to 
residential tenants and their invitees. Thus, the Complex, unlike the shopping center in [Pruneyardj, 
is not the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum."); id. at 1039 (George, C.J., 
concurring) ("[TJhere is no state or federal constitutional right to distribute unsolicited pamphlets in 
a location (whether publicly or privately owned) not open to the general public, such as the closed 
interior hallways of the apartment buildings here at issue."). 
56 !d. at I 021 (plurality opinion). 
57Id. 
58Id. 
59 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020. 
60 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020-22 n.S (listing the court cases from states that 
declined to follow Pruneyard, pointing out that many of them had been sharply critical of 
Pruneyard). 
61 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020-22. 
62 One reason Justice Brown, writing for the plurality, may have stopped short of a frontal 
challenge to Pruneyard here was that the fifth vote for the judgment, Chief Justice George, distanced 
himself in his concurrence from broader efforts to rein in Pruneyard. See Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 
4th at 1036 (George, C.J., concurring). 
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was that it created doubt about whether California's liberty clause would 
continue to protect free-speech activity on private property.63 
2. State Appellate Decisions on Stand-Alone Stores 
Recent California appellate court decisions have provided a further 
indication of Pruneyard's tenuousness. Over the last several years, three 
different California state appellate courts addressed the issue of whether 
California's liberty clause protects free-speech activity on the property of 
stand-alone stores such as supennarkets and large retail stores.64 In each 
case, the appellate courts concluded that the free-speech activity was not 
protected.65 
In Trader Joe's Company v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., the First 
District Court of Appeal held that a free-standing supennarket's interest 
in controlling its private property outweighed society's interest in being 
able to use the sidewalk in front of the store to gather signatures on ballot 
initiative petitions.66 Employing the Pruneyard analysis to balance the 
competing interests of the property owner against those of society, the 
court concluded that the Trader Joe's store had not voluntarily assumed 
the character of a public forum. The court emphasized the limited nature 
of what the Trader Joe's store had invited the public to do on its 
premises: "Trader Joe's invites people to come and shop for food and 
food-related items. It does not invite them to meet friends, to eat, to rest 
or to be entertained. Indeed, citizens are not invited to 'congregate' at 
the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's.,,67 The court contrasted this with the 
decision of the owners of a shopping mall to offer dedicated courtyards, 
plazas and seating areas in which people could sit and discuss anything 
from shopping to civic matters.68 This, the court found, demonstrated 
that "Trader Joe's interest in maintaining exclusive control over its 
63 Gregory c. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1213 (2007) ("While 
declining to overrule Pruneyard for reasons of stare decisis, the Golden Gateway Center plurality 
nonetheless undermined the argument for transportation of constitutional rights to the private sector 
by holding that California's constitutional Liberty of Speech Clause does indeed protect only state 
action .... While the obsolete Pruneyard decision thus has been deprived of much of its precedential 
and all of whatever analytical support it ever had, the shattered ruin nonetheless remains a 
jurisprudential attractive nuisance for deformed constitutional interpretation."). 
64 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425 
(1999). 
65 Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106; Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. 
App. 4th 425. 
66 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425. 
67 [d. at 433. 
68 [d. 
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private property is stronger than the interest of a shopping mall.,,69 
As for society's need to use the Trader Joe's as a forum for 
gathering signatures, leafleting or other speech activity, the court 
concluded that society's interest was not very strong.70 While many 
people may gather at the store, the court emphasized that there were no 
facts showing that people were doing so for the purpose of interacting 
with one other: "[T]hose people come for a single purpose-to buy 
goods .... [T]he Santa Rosa Trader Joe's is not a public meeting place 
and society has no special interest in using it as such.,,71 The court 
reasoned that private property does not obtain a "public character" when 
the public visits it for a narrow purpose rather than for a variety of 
reasons that could potentially include engaging in political discourse or 
getting educated about the issues of the day. 72 
In further support of its conclusion, the court asserted that the 
plaintiffs arguing for greater speech protections had failed to meet their 
evidentiary burden.73 In the view of the Trader Joe's court, the 
Pruneyard court had been able to reach its conclusion only after seeing 
"tangible evidence that shopping centers were supplanting central 
business districts as the preferred public forum.,,74 In contrast, the 
Trader Joe's court concluded that, since the plaintiffs in that case had 
presented no such evidence, the court had no basis upon which it could 
fmd that the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's qualified as a constitutionally 
protected public forum. 75 
Similarly, in Van v. Target Corp and Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, the 
Second District Court of Appeal and Third District Court of Appeal, 
respectively, rejected free-speech claims.76 In each case citizens asserted 
that they had the right to engage in political activity by registering 
citizens to vote and gathering voter signatures on ballot petitions while 
standing in front of large stand-alone stores.77 Like the Trader Joe's 
court, these courts concluded that, in the context of stand-alone stores, 
the balance between society's free-speech interests and private property 




72 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 434. 
73 Id. 
741d. 
75 Id. ("In contrast [to Proneyard], in the present case there is absolutely no evidence in any 
of appellants' declarations that the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's has assumed a comparable role."). 
76 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003). 
77 Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; A/benson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106. 
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activity on their land.78 
D. THE CALIFORNIA HIGH COURT SPEAKS: FACTS AND 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FASHION VALLEY MALL 
273 
It was another incident in a shopping mall twenty years after 
Pruneyard that prompted the state high court to define the 
constitutionally protected places for free speech in modern-day 
California. On October 4, 1998, approximately forty members of the 
Graphics Communications International Union, Local 432-M, entered 
the Fashion Valley Mall.79 The union members began distributing 
leaflets to customers of the Robinsons-May retail store criticizing the 
store for advertising in the San Diego Union-Tribune newspaper, which 
was engaged in a labor dispute.so Mall officials appeared and told the 
union members to leave the property and informed them that they were 
trespassing since mall policy prohibited any kind of activity that urged 
customers not to patronize one of its stores.S! The union members 
initially protested. However, after a police officer arrived, the union 
members moved to public property at the entrance of the Mall, where 
they briefly distributed additionalleaflets.82 
Eleven days later, the union filed a complaint with the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging that the Fashion Valley Mall 
had violated the National Labor Relations Act83 by prohibiting the union 
members from distributing leaflets inside the mall. 84 An administrative 
law judge found for the union.85 The judge ruled that the mall's rules 
78 Albertson 's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 121 ("A location will be considered a quasi-public forum 
only when it is the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum as a place where people choose 
to come and meet and talk and spend time. The evidence does not establish that the Albertson's 
store is such a place."); Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1390 ("We decline to extend the holding in 
Pruneyard to the entrance and exit area of an individual retail establishment within a larger shopping 
center. . .. In view of the undisputed evidence that those particular areas lacked any public forum 
attributes, the trial court properly concluded that any societal interest in using respondents' stores as 
forums for exercising expressive activities did not outweigh respondents' interest in maintaining 
control over the use of their stores."). 
79 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 855 (2007). 
8°Id. 
81 Id. at 856. 
821d. 
83 The National Labor Relations Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an 
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of certain rights, including 
"the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." 29 V.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158(a)(I) 
(Westlaw 2009), quoted in Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 855 n.l. 
84 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 854. 
85Id. at 855. 
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prohibiting consumer boycotts on mall property violated the National 
Labor Relations Act.86 The NLRB later affirmed the administrative law 
judge's decision. 87 
Subsequently, Fashion Valley Mall petitioned for review of the 
NLRB decision before the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit.88 The court of appeals issued an opinion on June 
16, 2006, stating that it had to decide whether the mall's prohibition of 
boycott activity violated the National Labor Relations Act and, if so, 
whether California law empowered the mall to enforce such a 
prohibition. 89 Since the court concluded that the answer to the first 
question was 'yes,' the outcome of the case turned on the answer to the 
second question.9o Recognizing that this second question involved an as-
yet-undecided issue of California law, the court of appeals requested that 
the California Supreme Court decide whether California law allowed the 
mall to enforce an anti-boycott rule on its premises.91 
The California high court granted review.92 In a decision issued on 
December 24, 2007, the California Supreme Court held that California 
law prohibited Fashion Valley Mall from enforcing its anti-boycott 
rule.93 By a 4-3 majority, accompanied by a vigorous dissent, the court 
concluded that California's Constitution extended broad free-speech 
protections to the private property of Fashion Valley Mall, thereby 
affirming the Pruneyard doctrine as good law.94 
86 Id. at 856. 
87 On October 29, 2004, the NLRB issued an opinion, relying in part on Prune yard, that 
affinned the administrative law judge's decision. stating: "California law pennits the exercise of 
speech and petitioning in private shopping centers, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
rules adopted by the property owner. [The rule at issue here], however, is essentially a content-
based restriction and not a time, place, and manner restriction permitted under California law. That 
is, the rule prohibits speech 'urging or encouraging in any manner' customers to boycott one of the 
shopping center stores .... [I]t appears that the purpose and effect of this rule was to shield [the 
Mall]'s tenants, such as the Robinsons-May departtnent store, from otherwise lawful consumer 
boycott handbilling. Accordingly, we find that [the Mall] violated Section 8(a)(I) .... " Fashion 
Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 856. 
88 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 857. 
89Id. 
9() Id. 
91Id. ("The court of appeals [for the District of Columbia Circuit] observed that 'no 
California court has squarely decided whether a shopping center may lawfully ban from its premises 
speech urging the public to boycott a tenant"'). 
92Id. at 857. 
93Id. at 869-70. 
94 The court's primary holding was that the mall's rule was a content-based restriction on 
speech that must be subjected to strict scrutiny, a test that the mall's rule failed. "The Mall's 
purpose to maximize the profits of its merchants is not compelling compared to the Union's right to 
free expression." Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 869-70. However, to reach that conclusion the 
Court first afftrmed that the right to free speech extended to the interior of a private shopping mall. 
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II. THE MEANING OF FASHION VALLEY MALL: EXTENDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION TO FREE-SPEECH 
ACTIVITY AT STAND-ALONE STORES 
275 
The consequence of Fashion Valley Mall to the body of law 
concerning places for free speech in California will be two-fold. First, 
the state high court's unequivocal affirmation of the Pruneyard 
doctrine9s will put to rest questions about the continued viability of 
constitutional protection for free speech on private property in California. 
The court's holding will be seen as a rejection of claims that Pruneyard 
is an unconstitutional infringement on private property rights and that it 
is an outdated doctrine from an overly activist 1970's jUdiciary.96 
Second, by so squarely endorsing the necessity of places for protected 
speech, Fashion Valley Mall will encourage lower courts to apply 
constitutional free speech protections to private property beyond 
shopping malls.97 In doing so, this Note asserts, the reasoning of 
Fashion Valley Mall dictates that those courts should employ the 
"interference test," an analysis that presumes speech is protected, rather 
than unprotected.98 Each of these ideas will be discussed in tum. 
A. FASHION VALLEY MALL CLEARLY AFFIRMED THE 
PRUNEYARD DOCTRINE 
The Pruneyard decision made California the first state in the nation 
to find that its state constitution extended the reach of its free-speech 
clause to protect speech activity in private shopping centers.99 This 
provided significantly greater free-speech protection than the federal 
constitution, which protects speech activity only on government 
In doing so the Court thereby directly affinned Pruneyard as good law based on its merits, rather 
than merely due to adherence to stare decisis, for the first time since Pruneyard was originally 
decided. 
9S Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 870. 
96 See generally Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must 
Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133, 145 (I989); Gregory C. 
Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1146 (2007). 
97 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 870. 
98 The basis of the "interference test" was articulated by the court in In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 
2d 845 (I 967}. 
99 Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the 
Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 533,550 (2004) (noting that California was 
the first state in the nation to recognize a right to free speech in private shopping malls under its state 
constitution after the U.S. Supreme Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (l976) held such a 
right did not exist under the U.S. Constitution). 
15
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property. 100 This "groundbreaking decision" 101 generated controversy. 
Pruneyard came under assault and was characterized as an infringement 
on private property rights that was unconstitutional under prior U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. 102 Others simply criticized Pruneyard as 
activist judicial policy-making that would fail the test of time. 103 
However, a unanimous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed 
Pruneyard. The Court held that nothing in the federal constitution or 
prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions limited "the authority of[a] State to 
exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own 
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by 
the Federal Constitution."I04 
While California courts followed Prune yard, its critics never went 
away. Two main lines of criticism have shadowed Prune yard since its 
inception: 1) that it was an unconstitutional infringement on private 
property rights, and 2) that it was the result of a temporarily activist 
judiciary and no longer relevant in modem times. 105 In light of the fact 
that the California Supreme Court had never directly affirmed 
100 Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507. 
101 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1016 (2001) 
(describing Prune yard as "a groundbreaking decision"). 
102 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 911 (1979) (Richardson, J., 
dissenting) ("The majority relegates the private property rights of the shopping center owner to a 
secondary, disfavored, and subservient position vis-a-vis the 'free speech' claims of the plaintiffs. 
Such a holding clearly violates federal constitutional guarantees announced in Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)."), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech 
Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. 
REv. 133, 153 (1989) (describing the continued viability of Pruneyard as "suspect" in light of recent 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring the government to compensate private property owners for 
taking their land for use by others). 
10) Harry G. Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collisions of 
Private Property Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 1,44 (1994) 
(characterizing Pruneyard's impact as an attack on "justice, equity, and coherence"); Gregory C. 
Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1146 (2007) ("This judicially-fashioned free 
speech right to trespass on private property found no support in the language, structure, or history of 
the California Constitution. Indeed, other than a perfunctory quotation of the pertinent clause with 
no further analysis of the language, the California Supreme Court did not pause in its policy-making 
zeal to consider text, context or history. In sum, Pruneyard 'appears to be more a decision of desire 
than analytical conviction. "'). 
104 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). Moreover, the Court also 
rejected both the mall's claims that restricting its right to exclude citizens who wish to speak to 
others was a Fifth Amendment violation as a taking of their property without just compensation and 
a Fourteenth Amendment violation of the mall's guarantee against the deprivation of property 
without due process oflaw. 
lOS See Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 914 (Richardson, 1., dissenting) ("A private shopping owner 
is protected by the federal Constitution from unauthorized invasions by persons who enter the 
premises to conduct general 'free speech' activities unrelated to the shopping center's purposes and 
functions."). 
16
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Pruneyard, both of these critiques gained traction over time. 106 
Following Golden Gateway and the state appellate decisions restrictively 
applying Pruneyard it appeared that Pruneyard was on the way to 
becoming "obsolete.,,107 However, by directly affinning Pruneyard in 
unqualified tenns, the high court in Fashion Valley Mall implicitly 
rejected further challenges to Pruneyard's vitality. lOS 
1. Pruneyard is not an unconstitutional infringement on private 
property rights 
The primary criticism of Pruneyard is that by requiring that free-
speech activities be allowed on private property it violates property rights 
protected under the federal Constitution.109 The crux of this argument is 
that to deny property owners the right to exclude persons from their 
property infringes on the prohibition against government deprivation of 
property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 11O A related argument is that if the government 
requires free-speech activities on private land, it has engaged in a 
"taking" of private property for public use as defined by the Fifth 
Amendment. If a taking has occurred, under the Fifth Amendment the 
government must provide just compensation to the property owner. III 
106 See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the 
Collisions of Private Property Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. I 
(\994); Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145 (2007). 
107 Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1213 (2007) 
(describing the effect of Golden Gateway on Pruneyard as depriving it of all of its analytical 
strength and most of its precedential value). 
108 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 870 (2007). 
109 See Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 914 (Richardson, J., dissenting); John A. Ragosta, Free 
Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE 
L. REv. I (\ 986); Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property 
Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133 (\ 989). 
110 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 552-53 (1972) ("We granted certiorari to 
consider petitioner's contention that the decision below violates right of private property protected 
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); see also Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in 
Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133,145 
(\ 989) ("The most basic common law property right is the right to exclusive possession. Property 
owners are generally free to choose who may use their property, when, and for what purposes. 
Persons who have been invited onto private property become trespassers if they refuse to leave when 
requested to do so. Persons with permission to be on land for a limited purpose become trespassers 
when their activities exceed the scope of their invitation. State common law and statutory property 
rights define the scope of property rights protected under the Constitution. The constitutional right 
of an owner to control the use of property should not be denied in favor of a competing right that is 
not based on the Constitution or other federal law."). 
III See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,831 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
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However, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically declined to find a 
violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment in Pruneyard. 112 
Nevertheless, the property-rights critique of Pruneyard gained traction 
because the California Supreme Court for thirty years following 
Pruneyard declined to affirm that the balance between free-speech rights 
and private property rights favored speech. I 13 
The majority in Fashion Valley Mall closed the door on the property 
rights challenges to Pruneyard by unequivocally stating that 
constitutional free-speech protections extend to free-speech activity on 
private property: "A shopping mall is a public forum in which persons 
may reasonably exercise their right to free speech guaranteed by article I, 
section 2 of the California Constitution.,,1l4 In doing so, the court walked 
through a detailed history of how it had respected both state and federal 
constitutional rights in balancing property rights with free-speech 
needs. I 15 Acknowledging the private property rights argument, the 
Fashion Valley Mall court reiterated that such an argument had failed 
thirty years earlier and would fail again today since requiring a shopping 
mall to allow free-speech activity did not "unreasonably impair the value 
or use of their property as a shopping center." I 16 
By articulating the foundation of the Pruneyard doctrine so directly, 
112 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) ("Here the requirement 
that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on 
shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appeJlants' 
property rights under the Taking Clause .... There is also little merit to appellants' argument that 
they have been denied their property without due process oflaw."). 
113 Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1205 (2007) ("The 
greatest rebuttal to the policy advocates of transplanting free speech rights into the foreign soil of the 
private sector lies in the impossibility of carefully controlling the spread of this alien vegetation into 
new fields of private human endeavor once it has taken root."); see also Julian N. Eule & Jonathan 
D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There 
Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537,1564-1565 (1998) (characterizing Prune yard as a "radical 
departure" from traditional respect for private property rights). 
114 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 869-70 (2007). 
lIS [d. at 858-63. 
116 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 
U.S. at 83). This entire line of argument against Prune yard is strikingly similar to the claim that 
"economic substantive due process" rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are infringed 
by government regulation of businesses. That doctrine, known as "Lochnerism" after Lochner v. 
N. Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), held sway for a time in the early twentieth century but was resoundingly 
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Pa"ish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(upholding a state law that required a minimum wage for female employees). See also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545 (2d ed. 2005) ("Since 1937, not one state or federal 
economic regulation has been found unconstitutional as infringing liberty of contract as protected by 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court has made it clear that 
economic regulations - laws regulating business and employment practices - will be upheld when 
challenged under the Due Process Clause so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose."). Nevertheless, this line of attack on Pruneyard has persisted. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss2/5
2009] FREE SPEECH ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 279 
the Fashion Valley Mall court explicitly rejected the critiques of 
Pruneyard as an unconstitutional taking of private property. The 
Fashion Valley Mall court's affirmation is all the more powerful because 
it lacked any of the caveats that the Golden Gateway plurality used when 
adhering to Pruneyard due to principles of stare decisis. I 17 
2. Pruneyard remains relevant and necessary 
Pruneyard's critics have also engaged in a political assault on the 
decision, attempting to characterize it as an outdated doctrine that was 
the product of a radical judiciary that prioritized social policy-making 
over respect for the Constitution. I IS This criticism of Pruneyard 
appeared to find favor in the Golden Gateway plurality, which described 
in great detail the large number of state courts that had rejected a similar 
interpretation of their own state constitutional free-speech clauses in the 
years since Pruneyard. 119 In so doing, the Golden Gateway plurality 
suggested it may well have come to the exact opposite conclusion of the 
Pruneyard court had the issue been addressed for the first time under 
modem conditions rather than decades earlier. 120 
However, in directly affirming the application of Pruneyard to keep 
shopping malls open to free-speech activity in 2007 and beyond, the 
Fashion Valley Mall majority left little room for this line of criticism to 
credibly persist. The court noted the importance of keeping California's 
broad constitutional free-speech protections intact in the twenty-first 
century: "For the California Constitution is now, and has always been, a 
117 See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1022 
(2001) ("Nonetheless, [Pnmeyard] has been the law in California for over 20 years. Whether or not 
we would agree with [Pruneyard's] recognition of a state constitutional right to free speech in a 
privately owned shopping center if we were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to 
follow it under principles of stare decisis."). 
118 See Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145 (2007) ("The 
Pruneyard decision should be recognized as the anachronistic product of a transitory era in 
American legal history during which the courts openly assumed powers to advance preferred social 
policies through the venue of constitutional litigation, untethered to the words of a constitutional 
charter or the historical setting in which those words were given legal force. . .. Pruneyard is a 
weed in the garden of constitutional jurisprudence. Pruneyard should be shorn off at the roots, lest 
its noxious vegetation crowd out the growth of a healthier approach to constitutional 
interpretation."); see also John A. Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State 
Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1986); Frederick W. Schoepflin, 
Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 
WASH. L. REv. 133 (1989). 
119 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020-22 n.5. 
120 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1022 ("Whether or not we would agree with [Pruneyard's] 
recognition of a state constitutional right to free speech in a privately owned shopping center if we 
were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to follow it under the principles of stare 
decisis."). 
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'document of independent force and effect particularly in the area of 
individual liberties. ",121 The court observed in Fashion Valley Mall that 
private property has continued to "replace the streets and sidewalks of 
the central business district" as gathering places for citizens and thus 
venues for free speech. 122 The Fashion Valley Mall court extensively 
traced the cases finding constitutional protection for free speech on 
private property, spending nearly half of the opinion detailing those 
decisions and their rationales. 123 In doing so, the California court 
indicated that its affirmation of Pruneyard was deeply rooted in 
precedent and principles that remained both relevant and necessary. 
B. A POST-FASHION VALLEY MALL APPROACH TO WHETHER 
PRIVATE PROPERTY QUALIFIES AS A PUBLIC FORUM: 
THE INTERFERENCE TEST 
By affirming Prune yard, the Fashion Valley Mall court embraced 
the overarching principle that "[the] California Constitution provides 
greater, not lesser, protection for ... free speech.,,124 However, the court 
did not have the opportunity to settle the looming question of when, or 
whether, that speech protection applies to venues other than shopping 
malls. 125 That is a question the Pruneyard court left unsettled and lower 
courts have struggled with ever since. 126 
Justice Chin, writing for the three Fashion Valley Mall dissenters, 
attempted to convert the majority's silence regarding the scope of the 
constitutional protection into a pronouncement limiting the public forum 
doctrine only to large shopping malls and not to individual stores: 
"Today's majority opinion carefully says nothing casting doubt on the 
recent cases involving stand-alone stores, and they are surely correct.,,12? 
121 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863 (quoting Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal. 
4th 468, 49 I (2000)). 
122 Jd. at 858. 
123 Nearly seven pages of the fifteen-page majority opinion were devoted to recounting the 
cases applying the public forum doctrine to private property under California's Constitution. 
Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 858-64. 
124 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 868. 
125 The owners of Fashion Valley Mall did not directly challenge the notion that they were 
constitutionally required to allow free-speech activities on their property, challenging only the extent 
of that constitutional requirement and whether it prohibited the mall from imposing particular 
restrictions on speech activity. Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 858. 
126 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 433 (1999) 
("Pruneyard establishes that there is a state constitutional right to exercise free speech and 
petitioning activity on private property. However, the Pruneyard court did not purport to articulate 
the precise scope of that right. "). 
127 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 880 (Chin, J., dissenting). 
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But there is every reason to believe that the Fashion Valley Mall majority 
knew exactly what it was doing when it wholeheartedly embraced 
Pruneyard: opening the door to new approaches to preserving places 
where free speech can thrive in today's world. By issuing an unqualified 
affirmation of Prune yard, 128 the high court indicated that protecting 
places for speech remains as necessary now as it was thirty years ago. 
1. There is a need for new public forums for free speech because large 
individual stores have replaced giant indoor shopping malls as 
gathering places 
In a series of cases over the last decade, California appellate courts 
have declined to protect citizens' right to engage in free-speech activity 
on the property of large stand-alone stores. 129 There is a fundamental 
problem with this result. Large stand-alone stores, either as the anchors 
of open air strip-malls or operating on their own, have increasingly 
replaced Pruneyard-era enclosed shopping malls as places where citizens 
come into contact with others. 130 The courts need to acknowledge this 
shift by recognizing that the entrances to stand-alone stores should be 
considered public forums that must be made available for free-speech 
activity. 
The Pruneyard court relied heavily on evidence in the record 
demonstrating that there had been a massive shift in recent decades away 
from shopping in the traditional downtown business districts in favor of 
shopping in large shopping malls. l31 Among the evidence the Pruneyard 
court considered were statistics demonstrating that retail sales in central 
San Jose had dropped so dramatically that the downtown business district 
only accounted for five percent of the county's total retail sales. 132 
Nearly thirty years after Pruneyard, there has been a similar shift away 
128 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 870. 
129 See Van v. Target Corp., ISS Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003); Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425. 
130 See generally David Segal, Our Love Affair With Malls Is On The Rocks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
I, 2009, at BI (,There are roughly 1,500 malls in the United States, according to the International 
Council of Shopping Centers, many of them ailing, some of them being converted into office 
buildings, and others closing their doors for good. At Web sites like deadmalls.com, the carcasses of 
these abandoned buildings are photographed and toe-tagged, along with tributes from former 
shoppers."); The Mall Pall: Have America's Biggest Shopping Centers Lost Their Allure?, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Dec. 10, 2008, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle.cfm?articleid=2111 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). 
131 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 907 (1979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
132 Id. ("Retail sales in the central business district declined to such an extent that statistics 
have not been kept since 1973. In 1972 that district accounted for only 4.67 percent of the county's 
total retail sales."). . 
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from enclosed large shopping malls to open-air strip malls and stand-
alone stores. 133 Individual "big-box" stores have increasingly attracted 
busy shoppers who are no longer willing to spend whole afternoons 
wandering around the various stores inside large malls to find the right 
place to make their purchase. 134 According to the International Council 
of Shopping Centers, today less than five percent of shopping centers in 
the U.S. are enclosed malls.13S 
As the venues that have supplanted the small town business districts 
of old as the places people today gather to shop, meet, and talk, it is 
inconsistent for the courts to continue to treat large stand-alone stores 
such as Trader Joe's and Target differently from enclosed shopping malls 
in terms of free-speech access. 136 One appellate justice recently noted 
that it is the responsibility of the courts to reconcile the gap between the 
theory of free speech and the reality of ensuring opportunities for people 
to speak where their messages can be heard: 
It is anomalous to declare that a shopping center may constitute a 
public forum and then to exclude from that domain the sidewalks in 
the vicinity of the anchor business where most people go-the 
supermarket. It does sponsors of an initiative little good to be able to 
set up their table on the edge of a parking lot where they have, at best, 
minimal access to citizens on their way to shop in the supermarket. 137 
Just as changes in the fabric of society led the Pruneyard court to 
recognize the need for new protected gathering places for free-speech 
activities, a new wave of changes in the marketplace has reshaped the 
map of where people congregate today.138 Fashion Valley Mall provides 
133 See Tenisha Mercer, Aging Malls Fight to Remake Their Images, THE DETROIT NEWS, 
Mar. 3, 2005, at Al ("Years ago, avid shoppers like Janet Thomas flocked to places such as 
Northland Center, which launched the nation's indoor mall craze 50 years ago. Developers built 
malls as fast as they could and retailers of all sizes clamored to open up shops inside them. 
America's love affair with malls decimated many of its downtowns. But the winds are shifting 
again, and this time it's malls that are endangered as department stores consolidate and consumers 
increasingly choose stand-alone stores and Main Street-style open-air shopping plazas."). 
134 See Kortney Stringer, Abandoning the Mall, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at B I (major 
retailers increasingly opening stand-alone outlets to appeal to busy customers while shuttering stores 
located inside malls). 
135 International Council of Shopping Centers, Industry Fun Facts, 
hnp:/lwww.icsc.org/srchiabout/impactofshoppingcenters/02_DidYouKnow.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 
2009). 
136 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425 
(1999). 
137 Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 132 (Sims, J., concurring). 
138 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (\979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (\980). 
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the opportunity for California courts to take the next logical step. They 
should acknowledge that, since large indoor shopping malls have been 
significantly replaced by individual stand-alone stores as gathering 
places, those stand-alone stores represent new locations that must be 
recognized as protected public forums for free-speech activities. 
2. The prevailing analysis for whether private property qualifies as a 
public forum creates an improper presumption that citizen speech is 
not protected anywhere other than malls 
The Fashion Valley Mall court considered the application of free-
speech protections to a large-scale shopping mall that did not contest that 
it was constitutionally required to allow at least some expressive activity 
on its property.139 Therefore, the state's high court did not need to 
determine whether constitutional free-speech protections applied, an 
inquiry that balances the interests of the individual property owner 
against society's interests in conducting free-speech activities on the 
particular property.140 However, the appellate courts that have been 
called upon to do so have applied this balancing of interests test in a way 
that effectively creates a heavy presumption against protecting citizen 
speech. 141 
In rejecting attempts by citizens to register voters and collect 
petition signatures outside of retail stores, appellate courts have made 
their decisions based on the presumption that speech activities are not 
constitutionally protected in a given place unless "the property owner has 
so opened up his or her property for public use as to make it the 
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.,,142 The primary 
factors considered by the courts in determining whether this presumption 
can be rebutted and the private property rises to the level of a public 
forum are 1) the extent of the invitation by the property owner to the 
public, 2) the nature of the primary use of the property, 3) any 
relationship between the speech activities and the primary use of the 
property, and 4) the size of the business. 143 Some courts have also 
139 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 858 (2007). 
140 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 433. 
141 See Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (signature gatherers failed to prove the entrance area 
of a retail store functioned as a public forum); Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (signature 
gatherers failed to prove a grocery store was the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum); 
Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425 (signature gatherers failed to provide evidence that the Trader 
Joe's store had supplanted the town's central business district as the preferred place people chose to 
come to meet and spend time with one another). 
142 Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 118 (citing Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425). 
143Id. at 119; see also Planned Parenthood v. Wilson, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1662, 1671 (1991). 
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considered the public's interest in using the particular piece of private 
property as a venue for free speech. l44 In each case, the courts have 
concluded that private property smaller than a mall is not a public 
forum. 145 
Pruneyard specifically declined to make the size of the premises a 
determinative factor in the public forum balancing test. 146 While the 
appellate courts acknowledged this, they nevertheless gave heavy weight 
to the fact that individual stores are vastly different from large shopping 
malls. 147 Individual stores, even large ones, inherently offer far fewer 
products than a gigantic mall and have significantly less space to make 
available for the public to interact with one another. Primarily 
examining the purpose of property owners in inviting the public to their 
property or the purpose of the public in visiting the property, to see if 
either had a "public character" to it, the appellate courts have been 
careful not to describe the physical size of the property as the dispositive 
factor in the public forum determination. 148 However, by focusing on the 
number of uses the property owner offers to the public, the appellate 
courts have in effect made size the determinative factor in the public 
forum analysis since, by their nature, individual stores can offer many 
fewer uses to their visitors than large, multi-store malls. 149 
While acknowledging that the size of the private property is not the 
determinative factor, the recent appellate court decisions nevertheless 
have concluded that, in the balance between free speech and property 
rights, stores smaller than massive malls are not required to allow free-
144 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 433. 
145 [d.; Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106. 
146 Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 119 ("Pruneyard did not hold that free speech and 
petitioning activity can be exercised only at large shopping centers or that such activities can be 
exercised on any property except for individual residences and modest retail establishments. [citation 
omitted] The size of the business is simply a factor to be weighed in balancing the competing 
interest of the owner and society-'[t]he smaller the business, the more weight the owners' rights 
will have .... (quoting Allred v. Shawley, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1489, 1496 (199\)). 
147 See Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 433, where the court stated that it was not hinging 
public forum status on the size of the property but effectively did just that by describing size as the 
critical factor. 
148 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 434 ("Trader Joe's opens its property to the public so the 
public can buy goods. It does not offer its property for any other use. Thus, in contrast to Pruneyard 
and other multipurpose shopping centers, the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's does not have a 'public 
character. "'). 
149 The dispositive effect of the size of the venue on the public-forum analysis was strikingly 
evident in Slevin v. Home Depot, 120 F. Supp. 2d 822, 834 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that a 
twelve-person seated area outside a stand-alone store's main exit, which the store itself characterized 
as a "Public Forum Area" in a posted sign, was not protected for free-speech activity, since the area 
was not the "hub of activity envisioned in Pruneyard, which involved a 21 acres shopping center 
housing some 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a cinema"). 
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speech activities. 150 This analysis of whether private property qualifies 
as a public forum effectively presumes that free-speech activity is not 
protected on private property other than large shopping malls. 
Particularly in light of Fashion Valley Mall, it is clear that this analysis 
fails to enforce the vigorous free-speech protections required by 
California's Constitution. 151 
3. The proper test for whether private property is a public forum is 
whether free-speech activities would unreasonably interfere with 
the primary use of the property 
Until now, California appellate courts have largely declined to 
extend constitutional protection to citizens who attempt to exercise their 
speech rights on private property smaller than large malls. However, the 
Fashion Valley Mall court held that the California Constitution's liberty 
clause continues to require that citizens be allowed to exercise their right 
to free speech on private property.152 The appellate courts should take 
the next logical step and apply the Pruneyard balancing test to put the 
burden of proof on the party who wishes to restrict speech, rather than on 
citizens wishing to speak. In doing so, the courts would facilitate 
constitutionally protected free-speech activity rather than discouraging it. 
The right of private property owners to exclude others is inherently 
circumscribed by their voluntary decision to open their venues to the 
general public. 153 In the case of a large retail store, "access by the public 
is the very reason for its existence.,,154 These property owners impliedly 
accept as part of the cost of doing business that, in exchange for 
benefiting from having the public to come onto their premises, they must 
accommodate the public's reasonable needs. 155 That bargain does not 
entirely deprive the property owner of the basic rights to "the exclusive 
150 Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106; Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. 
App. 4th 425. 
151 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 870 (2007). 
IS2Id. 
IS) In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217-18 (1970) ("The shopping center may no more exclude 
individuals who wear long hair ... who are black, who are members of the John Birch Society, or 
who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these characteristics or 
associations, than may the City of San RafaeL"). 
154 Lombard v. La., 373 U.S. 267, 275 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
155 See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, 61 Cal. 2d 
766,771 (1964) ("[T]he countervailing interest which plaintiff endeavors to vindicate emanates from 
the exclusive possession and enjoyment of private property. Because of the public character of the 
shopping center, however, the impairment of plaintiff's interest must be largely theoretical. Plaintiff 
has fully opened his property to the public."); see also In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872,878 (1969). 
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possession and enjoyment of private property."IS6 However, the decision 
of a property owner to voluntarily open his doors to benefit from public 
access is intertwined with the responsibility of respecting the public's 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. ls7 
Property owners should bear the burden of justifying to a court why 
they should be allowed to require citizens to leave their constitutional 
rights at the door. The legal analysis of whether a particular private 
property constitutes a public forum should begin from the presumption 
that the speech activity is protected and place the burden of proving 
otherwise on the property owner wishing to restrict free-speech activities. 
The courts should start from the premise that California's free-speech 
protections should apply to any private property that has been made 
"freely and openly accessible to the public.,,158 Courts should place the 
burden of proving that a particular property is not a public forum on the 
property owner who wishes with one hand to benefit from inviting the 
public onto their land but with the other to deny citizens their right to 
communicate with one another about the issues of the day. 
The Fashion Valley Mall court articulated the proper test for 
whether private property qualifies as a public forum in its recitation of its 
holdings in In re Lane and In re Hoffman. 159 In In re Lane, the state high 
court described the threshold inquiry for whether free-speech protections 
apply to a particular piece of private property as one that simply asks 
whether the owner has invited the public to patronize its store and in so 
doing has allowed the public to freely traverse the sidewalk or walkway 
in front of its store. 160 If that is the case, then the court asks whether 
permitting the free-speech activities would unreasonably interfere with 
the owner's primary use of the property.161 If there is no unreasonable 
interference from the free-speech activities, the property owner cannot 
116 Schwartz-Torrance, 61 Cal. 2d at 771. The court in Fashion Valley Mall was clear that the 
owner of private property that qualifies as a public forum retains the ability to impose reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech activities to ensure they do not conflict with the 
primary use of the property. These can include a wide variety of restrictions, such as the 
requirement of a cleaning deposit if leaflets are to be distributed, prohibitions on the use of 
loudspeakers, limits on the location where the speech activities may be conducted, and a cap on the 
number of people who are conducting speech activities on the premises at any given time. Fashion 
Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863-65. 
Il7 See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217-18 (1970). 
Il8 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1033 (2001). 
Il9 In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872; In re HotTman, 67 Cal. 2d 845 (1967). 
160 In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d at 878. 
1611d. (UIn utilizing the [private] sidewalk for such purposes those seeking to exercise such 
rights may not do so in a manner to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to 
or from the premises."). 
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completely exclude them from the property. 162 
The court's application of this "interference test" in In re Hoffman 
is instructive. There, the high court held that Vietnam War protesters 
had the right to hand out leaflets in a privately owned train station in Los 
Angeles as long as the free-speech activity did not interfere with the 
legitimate conduct of railroad business. 163 The court first noted that the 
three railroad companies that owned the train station generally invited 
the public onto their premises, making it accessible without restriction. 164 
Then the court examined whether the free-speech activities of leafleting 
and talking with train patrons impeded the primary use of the railroad 
station, finding that they did not: 
Those activities in no way interfered with the use of the station. They 
did not impede the movement of passengers or trains, distract or 
interfere with the railroad employees' conduct of their business, block 
access to ticket windows, transportation facilities or other business 
legitimately on the premises. Petitioners were not noisy, they created 
no disturbance, and [they] did not harass patrons who did not wish to 
hear what they had to say. Had petitioners in any way interfered with 
the conduct of the railroad business, they could legitimately have been 
asked to leave. 165 
By incorporating the interference test into the Pruneyard analysis, 
the courts would properly balance the speech and property interests 
protected under California's Constitution. The interference test would 
shift the burden of proof in public-forum cases to those property owners 
who wish to block efforts to inform the public about important issues. 
The way the Trader Joe's court conducted the Pruneyard analysis 
requires citizens attempting to stimulate dialogue to bear the burden of 
providing sufficient evidence that they have the right to engage in free-
speech activities on a particular piece of private property.166 The 
1621d. 
163 In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 851. 
164 Id. The court implied that the threshold test for finding a public forum is unlikely to have 
been met if the railroad companies had only aHowed ticket-holders to enter the station. 
165 In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 851. 
166 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425,434 (1999) 
("The Pruneyard court's conclusion that the societal interest in using shopping centers as forums for 
expressive activity outweighed the property interests of the shopping center owner was supported by 
tangible evidence that shopping centers were supplanting central business districts as the preferred 
public forum, i.e., the place where people chose to come and meet and talk and spend time. In 
contrast, in the present case there is absolutely no evidence in any of appeHants' declarations that the 
Santa Rosa Trader Joe's has assumed a comparable role. Thus, in contrast to the shopping center 
discussed in Pruneyard, the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's is not a public forum uniquely suitable as a 
place to exercise free speech and petitioning rights."). 
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interference test instead would presume that under California's 
Constitution free-speech activities are protected on private property 
voluntarily made open to the public. Free-speech activities would be 
allowed unless the property owner could demonstrate to a court that the 
free-speech activities would unreasonably interfere with their preferred 
use of the property. 167 
Property-rights advocates might argue that this new test would harm 
small shopkeepers who would be forced to tolerate political rallies or 
petition gatherers who annoy their customers and hurt their business. 
However, if a property owner can provide credible evidence to a court 
demonstrating that free-speech activity would impede the free movement 
of customers, result in harassment of patrons, or create an excessive 
noise or disturbance, under the interference test that property would not 
be considered a public forum. 168 Moreover, as has been the case since 
Prune yard, property owners would continue to be allowed to impose 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on all free-speech 
activity.169 However, when they choose to open up their private property 
and issue an invitation to the public, property owners in California 
become bound to respect the broad free-speech rights guaranteed by 
California's Constitution and affirmed by the state high court in Fashion 
Valley Mall. 170 
III. CONCLUSION 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens noted that our 
nation's founding fathers considered the freedom of speech to be at the 
heart of the "secret of happiness.,,171 In light of the Fashion Valley Mall 
court's affirmation of the greater free-speech protections embodied in the 
167 One example of the kind of "interference" with the preferred use of their property that a 
property owner could potentially show is that free-speech activities would interrupt the functioning 
of the property owner's business by discouraging patrons from entering the store. See generally In 
re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 851. 
851. 
168 This follows the Court's description of the interference test in In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 
169 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 870 (2007). 
170 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th 850. 
111 Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, \312 (1993) 
("Those who won our independence believed ... liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to 
be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think 
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and 
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an 
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle 
of the American government."). 
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California Constitution, lower courts must take a fresh look at whether 
those protections safeguard citizen speech on the property of stand-alone 
stores. The courts shoulder a weighty burden to strike the right balance 
under California's Constitution between the competing values of free 
speech and property rights. 172 
As California courts address the question whether stores such as 
Target and Trader Joe's qualify as public forums for free-speech 
purposes, they must acknowledge the Fashion Valley Mall court's clear 
affirmation of Prune yard. In doing so, courts should continue to allow 
property owners to maximize the use of their property by enforcing 
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on free-speech activities. 
However, courts should presume that free-speech activities on property 
that the owner has voluntarily opened to the public are constitutionally 
protected. This presumption means that courts should place the burden 
of proof on those wishing to restrict speech, not on those wishing to 
speak. If a property owner can demonstrate that particular free-speech 
activities would unreasonably interfere with the owner's use of the 
property, a court should allow those free-speech activities to be 
prohibited. Otherwise, following Fashion Valley Mall, the California 
Constitution's liberty clause must be broadly construed to protect free 
speech on private property because the "freedom to think as you will and 
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and 
spread of political truth .... ,,173 
JON GOLINGER' 
172 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) 
("To protect free speech and petitioning is a goal that surely matches the protecting of health and 
safety, the environment, aesthetics, property values, and other societal goals that have been held to 
justify reasonable restrictions on property rights."). 
173 Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom o/Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1312 (1993) . 
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